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das. Instead, many judges attempt to shape their dockets by encouraging potential
litigants to bring particular cases. This encouragement takes the form of judges
signaling their own positions on an issue as well as their colleagues’ expected
support. This process is modeled as a signaling game, with both separating and
pooling equilibria resulting. The existence of pooling equilibria is of particular
interest, as it indicates some judges misrepresent the chances of success of a case
in order to induce desired legislation.
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ABSTRACT 
Contrary to traditional wisdom, judges are not passive receivers of their 
agendas. Instead, many judges attempt to shape their dockets by 
encouraging potential litigants to bring particular cases. This 
encouragement takes the form of judges signaling their own positions on 
an issue as well as their colleagues’ expected support. This process is 
modeled as a signaling game, with both separating and pooling equilibria 
resulting. The existence of pooling equilibria is of particular interest, as it 
indicates some judges misrepresent the chances of success of a case in 
order to induce desired legislation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the elected branches of government, the Judiciary is institutionally constrained 
from initiating policy. This does not mean that judges have no control over their own 
dockets. Although judges depend on litigants to initiate litigation, judges encourage 
potential litigants to bring particular cases. Judges have private information of the 
expected outcomes of future cases as they know their own position and have inside 
information on their colleagues’ positions; consequently judges can credibly signal the 
prospects of success of a given case. Signaling includes a judge volunteering comments 
in a speech that an as yet to be appealed decision of a lower court is constitutionally 
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unsound, or a majority opinion including obiter dicta suggesting that the author would 
provide the swing vote to the dissenters under different circumstances. This information 
constitutes signals which may convince a litigant to bring a case, and so creates an 
opportunity for the judge to shape the law on that topic. 
The notion that judges signal the outcome of future cases in order to actively shape 
their dockets stands in sharp contrast to the traditional view of judges as passive 
disinterested recipients of cases brought before them by independent parties1. Once cases 
are brought, certiorari and other powers not to hear provide some discretion,2 but the 
traditional view holds that judges have no other mechanism to seek a case on an issue on 
which they wish to shape the law.  Most contemporary court scholars take a less platonic 
view of judges, recognizing the influence of ideology and judicial potential for strategic 
action. These scholars recognize that judges have an incentive to shape their agendas, but 
they focus almost exclusively on institutional mechanisms, such as certiorari and 
precedent; they fail to seriously consider how judges use the extra-institutional 
mechanism of signaling to induce the cases they seek. 
This article provides a systematic account of how judges shape which cases are 
brought before them, by transferring their private information regarding a case’s potential 
for victory. It uses game theory and economic equilibrium concepts to establish what 
equilibrium outcomes occur under judicial signaling. As well as showing how and when 
                                                 
1 For example DORIS MARIE PROVINE: CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, at 7 
(1980). 
2 More than half of State courts of last resort have certiorari-like exclusion powers. See Lawrence Baum, 
Policy Goals in Judicial Gate-Keeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction, 21 AM. J. OF 
POL. SCI. 13, at 13 (1977).  
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signaling occurs, this analysis reveals an important result: that under certain conditions, 
judges have an incentive to misrepresent the chances of success of some cases. 
The degree of directness of judicial signals is constrained by mores of judicial 
circumspection, which limit judicial communication to the public. This particularly 
applies to communication regarding the prospects of potential litigation, because the Rule 
of Law requires that cases not be prejudged. Judicial indications of support for a position, 
therefore, can only occur in a limited number of forums and generally must be implicit or 
abstract, and thus without guarantee. How, then, can litigants distinguish between 
genuine signals and cheap talk – that is, potentially misleading signals? In this article, I 
show that two primary factors determine the reliability of judicial signals: first, the level 
of alignment between judicial and litigant interests, and second, the cost of signaling.  
Signaling occurs in two classes of cases. In the first, judges want to hear cases only if 
the position they support is ultimately successful. Then, the interests of the judge and the 
litigant arguing that position are fully aligned. Consequently, there is a full transfer of 
information, as any judicial signal is reliable. In the second class of cases, judges also 
want to hear cases even if they cannot gain majority support for their position. This is 
because judges sometimes seek vehicles to shape the law, either through their own 
persuasiveness, or by giving prominence to the issue in the hope of raising public 
awareness and pressuring other decision-makers. While the class of the public who 
support the same position may benefit from such action, the individual litigants’ benefit 
from this publicity is likely to be outweighed by the enormous cost of an unsuccessful 
litigation. Consequently, in the second class of cases, there is only partial alignment of 
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interest between judges and litigants who support the same position. In this second class 
of cases, judicial representations are sometimes reliable and other times not.  
Judges have to decide whether to signal, and whether to signal sincerely or 
ambiguously, and how overtly to signal. The results of the game show the optimal 
strategy for these three decisions, for two types of judge: those facing winning and those 
facing losing cases. With low credible signaling costs, pooling equilibria occur, in which 
both types of judge signal a winning case and litigants cannot distinguish between them.  
With credibility only satisfied by greater signaling costs, separating equilibria exist in 
which each type of judge signals truthfully and litigants can differentiate between the two 
types, and thus accurately predict their chances of success.  
To explore what signaling consists of in the judicial context, section I presents some 
instances of signaling. Section II introduces more formal signaling concepts and spells 
out the assumptions in the signaling model. Section II also uses the existing agenda 
setting literature to assess the empirical merit of the game’s signaling assumptions. 
Section III presents the game and its implications. The game models judicial choice over 
a continuum of endogenously determined signaling options. In conclusion, future 
extensions of the judicial signaling model are considered; judges’ use of signals to 
legislatures and lower courts is particularly ripe for such analysis. 
 
I. JUDICIAL SIGNALING THEORIES AND EXAMPLES 
According to one judge interviewed by H.W. Perry, if a judge wants to hear a case in 
a certain area, “[h]e says something [in an opinion] that might indicate that the court 
would be willing to hear a case which brought up certain issues. We say this is something 
that we are not deciding here, but that it is something that the Court might want to 
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resolve... I think generally that people are sometimes aware of what a justice might be 
interested in.”3  
To further illustrate what is meant by judicial signaling, this section highlights some 
recent examples of signaling from the Supreme Court justices. But signaling could be 
illustrated by drawing from cases from other courts and time periods; the model applies 
generally.4  
Dissents are, among other things, common forms of signaling. Alternative theories are 
unable to fully explain the phenomenon of the dissent. A published dissent is not an 
attempt to convince the majority of their error — this could explain circulated dissents, 
but by the time of publication, such an effort has been lost. Alternatively, dissents have 
been explained as unsuccessful threats: judges circulate dissents in an attempt to coerce 
the majority away from their position.5 Under this theory, publication is necessary, or else 
future threats would not be credible. But the damage which underlies the threat is 
presumably harm to judicial legitimacy, which applies equally to the dissenter as to 
members of the majority, thus rendering the threat non-credible. And since every judge 
has an interest in the legitimacy of the Judiciary, dissents are difficult to explain as 
criticism for their own sake.6  
Yet judges occasionally harshly emphasize their displeasure when it is clearly too late 
to influence the decision, for example by extravagantly damning their colleagues. For 
                                                 
3 H.W. PERRY: DECIDING TO DECIDE, at 213 (1994). 
4 Although signaling will be more influential when practiced by higher courts than courts of first instance, 
as signaling primarily delineates the boundaries of law and policy questions. 
5 LEE EPSTEIN AND JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE, at 59 (1998). 
6  See PERRY, supra note 3 at 174, who details another disincentive for publishing dissents. 
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example, in response to his colleagues ruling that the death penalty cannot apply to 
mentally retarded defendants, Justice Scalia recently awarded his colleagues “the Prize 
for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate” evidence of the majority’s argument.7 
Judges also express their displeasure at times by reading their dissents aloud from the 
bench. Justice Scalia did this in another recent death penalty case, Roper v. Simmons, 
when the Supreme Court held that the death penalty cannot apply to juvenile defendants,8 
and when the court held sodomy laws unconstitutional.9 
All of these elements are explicable if dissents are interpreted not as off-equilibrium 
gamesmanship or poor-losership, but instead as strategic attempts to establish a feasible 
alternative future majority. The purpose of providing this alternative is to suggest that 
future decisions need not necessarily arrive at the same conclusion. This theory explains 
the existence of highly critical attacks on majority opinions, such as the emphatic 
example above, despite the value placed on judicial circumspection. For if dissents are 
signals, these signaling efforts are bolstered by assertions of the weakness of the 
precedent being forged. Establishing the weakness of the majority’s case supports any 
claim of a possible future contrary outcome, and thus encourages litigants to bring the 
cases individual judges seek.10 
Other forms of judicial expressions can also be signals to litigants of anticipated 
outcomes, including majority opinions. One example is the June 2003 case of Federal 
                                                 
7 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, at 347 (2002). 
8 543 US __ (2005). 
9 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
10 Arguably, such dissents could also embolden lower courts to circumvent the precedent, further 
encouraging litigants to bring cases challenging that precedent. 
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Election Commission v. Beaumont in which a corporate contributor unsuccessfully 
challenged a longstanding ban on corporate electoral contributions.11 This decision 
constituted a rich opportunity for justices to signal the type of argument that would be 
most persuasive in the pending September 2003 challenge to McCain-Feingold campaign 
Act. As one commentator noted, McCain-Feingold law supporters “were quick to derive 
encouragement” from Beaumont, as Justice Souter’s majority opinion repeatedly 
emphasized the need for “deference to legislative choice” in campaign finance.12 
Concurrences can also constitute signals. In the same case, Justice Kennedy stated in 
concurrence that corporate contributions can be regulated more closely than corporate 
expenditures. But he stated: “were we presented with a case in which the distinction 
between contributions and expenditures under the whole scheme of campaign finance 
regulation were under review, I might join Justice Thomas’ [dissenting] opinion”. This is 
a common judicial strategy.13 It is a means of signaling potential future grounds for 
differentiation, with the purpose of encouraging current losers to continue to pursue this 
field of litigation.  
Judges can also signal what they do not want to hear, which can be expected to most 
commonly arise in majority opinions and their supporting cases. For example, in the 
Supreme Court’s landmark affirmative action case in 2003, Justice O’Connor indicated 
                                                 
11 539 US 1, at 1-2 (2003). 
12 Ban on Corporate Contributions Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at 20. 
13 For another recent example, see State Farm v. Campbell 123 S. Ct. 1513, at 1524-1525 (2003) in which 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, repeatedly emphasized that in this case, which introduced a new 
limit on punitive damages, there was only economic harm and not physical harm, implying that a 
different result may arise in physical damages cases. 
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that the court would not choose to revisit the issue of affirmative action for the next 25 
years, at least in regard to higher education.14 When the Court followed through on this 
intention, and refused to hear an appeal of an affirmative action plan, two Supreme Court 
judges noted the information conveying effect that failing to act can have. The justices 
considered that the denial was especially “important because of what it signals about this 
court’s ongoing commitment to exacting judicial review of race-conscious policies” and 
because it “invites speculation” that a prior contrary precedent has effectively been 
overruled.15 
Judicial signaling is not limited to published opinions. Other forms of judicial 
expression, such as bench opinions, speeches, articles or books can perform a similar 
function. The most notorious recent example was Justice Scalia’s speech in response to 
the 2002 Federal Appeals Court in the Ninth Circuit ruling that requiring students to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional as long as it contained the phrase 
“one nation under God”.16 While the case was on hold pending further review, Justice 
Scalia discussed the case as an example of a misinterpretation of the Constitution by 
lower courts, and went on to provide arguments to support his position.17 Six months 
after Scalia’s speech, an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court in the case. 
Justice Scalia’s actions constituted clear signals, but the motivation for his actions is 
ambiguous: Justice Scalia’s own views were easily predicted prior to his comments; the 
case was widely regarded as inevitably going to the Supreme Court; and as a result of his 
                                                 
14 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003). 
15 Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 124 S.Ct. 556, at 560 (2003). 
16 Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F. 3d 597 (2002). 
17 Scalia, Courts Misinterpreting Church-State Separation, http://www.cnn.com, Jan. 13, 2003. 
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comments, Justice Scalia was successfully petitioned to recuse himself. We will return to 
this example later, as the following analysis provides an alternative explanation to the 
common conclusion that Justice Scalia simply miscalculated. Essentially, the following 
model elucidated the trade-off between clarity in signaling and the associated increase in 
the cost to judicial reputation. 
It is clear from the examples above that judges use signals to encourage particular 
cases, by indicating both their own receptivity to hear a particular case and the likely 
future prospects of any case. However if judges use signals, the natural question is 
whether these signals are reliable, or whether judges could send misleading signal. 
It may seem antithetical to all accepted notions of the judicial role that judges would 
mislead the public in order to promote their own agendas. Yet even unusually stark 
judicial signals have been followed by incongruous results. The Supreme Court’s 2002-
2005 series of death penalty cases provides a notable example in which cases brought 
following unusually direct encouragement were nevertheless unsuccessful.  
In Atkins v. Virginia the Supreme Court held in a 5:4 opinion written by Justice 
Stevens that executing mentally retarded criminals was cruel and unusual punishment 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Stevens stated that a comparison to 
execution of juvenile offenders was telling.18 Two months later, when the Supreme Court 
rejected an application for a stay of execution by a juvenile defendant, Justice Stevens 
issued what was considered an unusually forthright public statement.19 Referring to 
                                                 
18 Atkins v. Virginia, at 315 n.18 (2002). 
19 See reactions in, for example, Justices Put Court to Re-examine Execution of Teenagers, New York 
Times, August 29, 2002. 
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Atkins, Justice Stevens wrote that “since that opinion was written, the issue has been the 
subject of further debate... Given the apparent consensus that exists... I think it would be 
appropriate for the court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity”.20 Justice 
Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joined, made a similar statement and joined Justice 
Stevens. Two months later, the court denied a writ of habeas corpus for a juvenile 
offender facing the death penalty.21 This failure was unsurprising, given that Stanford 
arose from original jurisdiction, under which cases seldom succeed. Despite the failure of 
the second attempt, this case was encouraging to death penalty opponents because Justice 
Souter also joined Justice Stevens’ dissent, which explicitly called for an end to that 
“shameful practice.” Yet two months later, the Court rejected without comment an appeal 
for review from a juvenile offender.22 
The judges may simply have been mistaken as to their chances of success, but this is 
an unsatisfactory explanation. If judges know their preferred outcomes are immediately 
unattainable, their only option to promote that position is to gamble that the public nature 
of their statements will put pressure on a colleague to switch sides. This is particularly 
appealing when contrary precedent currently exists, as was the background in the teen 
execution case. In fact, two years after the first signal from a Justice Stevens in Atkins, 
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Simmons case, and to reconsider instituting a ban 
on the execution of underage defendants. This illustrates why judges may want to send 
misleading signals: in 2003, Justice Stevens wanted to see put an end to juvenile 
                                                 
20 Paterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24, at 24 (2002). 
21 In Re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 715 (2002).  
22 Hain v. Mullin, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003). 
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executions, but lacked majority court support. Nevertheless he sent signals encouraging 
such litigation. The Hain case lost, but Stevens had nonetheless put the fate of juvenile 
defendants facing execution back on the national agenda. Within two years, Justice 
Kennedy had been persuaded to join such a majority. 
It is impossible to prove judicial intent in any given case, but the rest of this article 
argues firstly, that judges generally know their colleagues’ likely positions, secondly, that 
judges have an incentive to send misleading signals in certain circumstances, and thirdly, 
that the variation in the extent and cost of judicial signals can be systematically explained. 
 
II. AGENDA-SETTING AND SIGNALING 
There is a growing literature on the agenda-setting power of the Supreme Court. 
Examination of the Supreme Court’s discretionary power over the grant of certiorari has 
led to recognition that the Court has the power to shape its own agenda, and in doing so, 
to influence the political focus of the nation. This literature is highly valuable, illustrating 
the strategic processes Supreme Court judges undertake in making decisions as to which 
cases to decide, but there is a dearth of analysis of judicial signaling actions.  
One exception to the literature’s lack of contemplation of the possibility of judicial 
signaling is Peter Linzer’s analysis of certiorari.23 Linzer assessed what can be inferred 
from justices ‘going public,’ as well as from judicial silence, and a number of other 
potential signals.24 The other notable exception is testimony from judges that Perry 
collected, suggesting that judges send out signals to “invite cases.” As noted above, Perry 
                                                 
23 Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1979). 
24 Id at 1304. 
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quotes judges who state that the notion that the Supreme Court is a reactive institution, 
which has to wait for cases to come to it, “may exist more in theory than in practice”.25 
Despite Perry’s direct evidence from judges themselves, even the literature which 
explicitly contemplates strategic judicial behavior seldom considers judicial signaling. 
Consequently, this strategic literature struggles to provide an explanation as to why 
judges ever vote to grant certiorari for a case when the side they support is expected to 
lose. While some authors simply assume this never occurs,26 a majority of judges studied 
by Boucher and Segal sometimes grant certiorari to cases they then vote to affirm.27 This 
result is only irregular if it is assumed that judges’ strategic analysis is limited to the short 
term. While many authors have recognized that judges act strategically, their focus has 
largely been on short-term strategy: how judges ensure their favored outcome in any 
given case. For most studies, an assumption of judicial focus being short-term is 
implicit,28 for others it is explicit.29  
There is no reason to assume that judges have such a myopic focus, particularly for 
judges with lifetime tenure. Judges may seek to have the capacity to set the law of the 
land (or state or region), and be willing to sacrifice their interest in a given case to find a 
vehicle to direct the development of the law. Although Boucher and Segal begin their 
                                                 
25 PERRY, supra note 3, at 212. 
26 Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal and Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, at 404 (2002).  
27 Robert L. Boucher & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive 
Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. OF POLITICS 824, at 832 (1995). 
28 Baum, supra note 2, at 16. 
29 See e.g., EPSTEIN AND KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 18. 
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article with the claim that “[i]t is now common... to view Supreme Court justices as 
policy-minded decision makers,” they, and other scholars who have studied strategic 
judicial action, nevertheless have failed to consider the possibility that judges may look 
beyond the immediate facts of any given case to long-term strategic goals. This game 
models one such possible strategy. 
Although the agenda-setting literature is not on point, the empirical studies that 
literature contains are useful for assessing the reliability of the assumptions required to be 
made in a judicial signaling game. Section II.B is by no means a comprehensive literature 
review, but rather the section draws out elements relevant to this topic and useful in 
devising a model of judicial signaling. Before analyzing the agenda-setting literature, it is 
worthwhile introducing the essential concepts behind signaling models. 
 
II.A Signaling Analysis 
Economics has been used in analyses of a range of legal issues; an entire ‘law and 
economics’ literature has developed.30 However this literature has largely limited itself to 
applying full information market theory.31 There is a powerful realm of economic 
                                                 
30 See e.g. PETER NEWMAN (ED.), THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (1998). 
31 There are notable exceptions, such as an analysis of divergences of information in parties’ search for, and 
presentation of, evidence for trial – see Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, On the 
Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias, 16 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 65 
(2000); and an analysis of information available to parties but not available to, or verifiable by, a court – 
see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER AND RANDALL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 
(1994). Typically, even such studies which do consider uncertainty, however, model the asymmetry of 
information between parties, or else when they consider judges, the judges are the less informed, rather 
than the more informed, player. 
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analysis devoted to predicting behavior under conditions of incomplete information, or 
uncertainty. 
The question of how judges can induce parties to bring particular litigation judges 
seek is one of incomplete information. Judges are privy to ‘inside information’ not 
available to litigants, both as to their own and their colleagues’ likely positions on an 
issue. While interested spheres of the public analyze patterns of judicial behavior to 
predict judicial outcomes, such conclusions are inferential and unreliable compared with 
judges’ own expectations of how their colleagues will vote. As Caldera, Wright and Zorn 
succinctly put it: “judges deal with the same issues and a small number of individuals 
year after year, so knowledge about preferences is both easier to obtain and more likely to 
be accurate.”32  
Under conditions of incomplete information, there can be a market advantage for 
some informed parties to disseminate information to uninformed parties. That 
information is only valuable to the uninformed parties if the information is reliable, and 
so effective dissemination often requires authentication.33 This dissemination and 
authentication process is best modeled as a signaling game.  
In the judicial signaling game, judges are like sellers, and litigants are like buyers. 
Litigants have to decide whether to expend the resources on the good, litigation, in order 
to gain the utility of a winning case. A judge who wishes to hear a particular case is 
selling the prospect of success. Of the judges who wish to hear a case, any judge may be 
                                                 
32 Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-keeping 
in the Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549, at 551 (1999). 
33 Information can be made credible through costly signaling, reputation costs, competing groups making 
the same message, the other party independently checking, and threats of verification. 
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one of two types: those with a high-quality good, i.e. a winning coalition, and those with 
a low quality good, i.e. no support or only minority support. There are also two classes of 
cases: cases where a judge only wants to hear the case if the side he or she supports will 
win, and those the judge may wish to hear even if the side they support will lose. The 
second category could apply when the judge seeks a vehicle to express views or agitate 
for change. Any judge seeking to hear a case even if the side he or she supports will lose 
has a motivation to claim the goods are high-quality even if they are not. The suggestion 
that judges have an incentive to mislead litigants is contentious,34 which is ultimately 
proven in the model; but for the meantime, we will assume it is possible. 
If judges can be long-term strategists, they may be willing to sacrifice the outcome of 
a given case in favor of shaping the future direction of the law, for example by having a 
vehicle in which to write a strong dissent. Essentially, the two types of cases reflect two 
different orderings of judicial preferences. In the first class of cases, judicial preferences 
are: 
1. Hear the case in which the supported side wins  
2. Do not hear the case  
3. Hear the case in which the supported side loses 
The utility of judges supporting position A is confluent with the utility of litigants 
arguing position A. As such, each judge wants to reveal as much of their private 
information as they can within the limits of judicial circumspection, but does not have an 
                                                 
34 Two of the rare articles to consider the possibility of judicial guile are S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Cases 
for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 THE AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 902, at 903 (1978); and 
Jeffrey Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule 
of Four, 15 J. OF THEORETICAL POL. 87 (2003). 
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incentive to send misleading signals to either type of potential litigant. Signaling still 
takes place and leads automatically to full revelation.35 
In contrast, in the second class of cases, judicial preferences reverse the second and 
third ordering. While the utility of judges supporting position A is correlated with the 
interests of litigants arguing position A, there is a divergence of interests between these 
two players when position A is a losing one. This is essentially because, unlike the 
litigant, the judge has two aims: to see the position he or she favors supported by a 
majority, and to find appropriate vehicles for statements he or she wishes to make. The 
judge may be willing to promote the second aim at the expense of the first. Although 
some advocacy groups may share in this willingness to sacrifice the outcome of a case for 
a long-term goal, most litigants are typically only concerned with the first motivation: 
winning the case. The difference in preferences explains the full alignment of interests 
between the judge and the litigant supporting a particular side in the first case, and only a 
partial alignment of interest in the second class of case. 
In order to encourage litigation of cases they wish to hear, judges can send signals to 
potential litigants indicating they have a winning coalition. Because litigation is the sort 
of good that consumers cannot determine the value (i.e. the outcome) of prior to 
expending the costs of the litigation process, signaling is a particularly apt form of 
                                                 
35 Full alignment of interests has been modeled by Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, Collective 
Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment 
Procedures, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987); the unrestricted amendment model would be equivalent to 
a full alignment of interests between judges of litigants. The uninformed party gets their ideal preference. 
See also Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, Lobbying and Asymmetric Information, 74 PUBLIC CHOICE 
269 (1992). 
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inducement to litigate.36 Both types of judges can signal a winning coalition, but the costs 
of providing such a signal differs for judges with a coalition and those without.  
High quality sellers generally have a lower marginal cost in signaling than do low 
quality sellers. If sellers and buyers repeatedly interact,37 high-quality sellers develop a 
reputation of high quality, and so the marginal cost of signaling activity is lower.38  
The negative correlation between quality and cost means that high-quality sellers can 
afford to send signals which low-quality sellers cannot afford. If litigants only believe 
that a judge has a winning coalition if they observe very costly signals, judges with a 
winning coalition may be able to use such signals to distinguish themselves from their 
low-quality mimics. The conditions under which the outcome may occur are explored in 
the game. 
 
II.B The Agenda-Setting Literature and the Judicial Signaling Game Assumptions 
Applying signaling analysis to judicial agenda setting requires making a number of 
assumptions. These are: first, that judges act strategically; second, that judges draw utility 
from the outcome of cases; third, that judges have knowledge of the likely outcome of 
future cases;39 and fourth, that litigants consider signals justices send when deciding 
                                                 
36 See Philip Nelson, Advertising and Information, 82  J. POL. ECONOMY 729, at 752 (1974). 
37 With repeated dealings comes value in reputation, but signaling can be effective even in non-repetitive 
markets – see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 355, at 355 (1973).  
38 J. Hirshleifer & John Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty in Information – An Expository Survey, 70 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1406 (1979).  
39 In this game, judges are modeled as having perfect knowledge of their colleagues’ future behavior, but 
uncertainty could be added without substantially changing the results. See David Austen-Smith and John 
R. Wright, Competitive Lobbying for A Legislator’s Vote, 9 SOCIAL CHOICE WELFARE 229 (1992). Thus 
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whether to litigate. Although the agenda setting literature seldom addresses judicial 
signaling, it does encompass a different aspect of strategic judicial behavior, and so is 
helpful assessing the reasonableness of these four signaling assumptions. 
Judges act strategically when they make forward-looking decisions which “maximize 
their payoffs given their beliefs about the outcomes of subsequent decision nodes”.40 To 
do so requires anticipating the expected actions of other players, and devising responses 
in accordance with those expectations. This may involve, for example, taking an action 
contrary to the judge’s immediate preferences, to achieve a long-term goal or to prevent 
the judge’s least preferred policy outcome occurring.41  
There is disagreement in the literature over the extent of strategic judicial behavior,42 
yet numerous studies have found substantial theoretical and empirical evidence of some 
level of strategic behavior by judges in agenda setting.43 This strategic behavior can take 
                                                                                                                                                 
an assumption of perfect knowledge does not need to be defended, only an assumption of some private 
knowledge of other judges’ probable behavior. 
40 See Caldera, Wright and Zorn, supra note 32, at 554. 
41 See e.g., Epstein, Segal and Victor, supra note 26, at 404 and see EPSTEIN AND KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 
13. 
42 See e.g., Boucher and Segal, supra note 27, at 836, who argue the extent of strategic behavior varies by 
individual justice. Also compare Caldera, Wright and Zorn, supra note 32, at 550,  who argue that 
judicial agenda setting is particularly “fertile soil for strategic manipulation.” with PERRY, supra note 3, 
at 11,  who argues that judges deciding every case strategically would be institutionally overwhelming to 
the Judiciary, and so outcome-focused behavior is the exception rather than the rule. 
43 See e.g. Glendon Schubert, Policy Without Law: an Extension of the Certiorari Game, 14 STAN. L. REV. 
284 (1962) and Epstein, Segal and Victor, supra note 24, respectively. 
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a number of different forms, such as bargaining or threats to publish dissents.44 
Additionally, studies have found strategic judicial behavior in non-agenda setting 
situations.45  So there is considerable evidence to support the first assumption of strategic 
judicial action. 
Judges having an interest in, and gaining value from, the outcome of cases is 
fundamental to the logic of strategic agenda setting. Judges sometimes feel strongly about 
the outcome of issues before them, as is apparent from judicial interviews, some judicial 
opinions, speeches and acts, such as reading opinions from the bench. In his extensive 
interviews with judges and their colleagues, Perry found that while judges most 
commonly exercise jurisprudential thinking, there are some cases that judges care 
strongly about. 46 In those cases, judges exercise an outcome-focused mode of judicial 
analysis, asking whether the side the judge supports will win on the merits, whether the 
case is a good vehicle to achieve the outcome they desire, or whether a better case is in 
the pipeline.47  
Judges also sometimes care strongly about which cases come before them, as is clear 
from dissents from cert as is evident from judicial statements,48 and can be inferred from 
                                                 
44 EPSTEIN AND KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 58. 
45 See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
46 PERRY, supra note 3, at 276. 
47 Id. at 278. 
48 Discussing how this practice has become more common, Justice Stevens wrote: “One characteristic of all 
opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari is manifest. They are totally unnecessary. They are 
examples of the purest form of dicta, since they have even less legal significance than the orders of the 
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some judicial behavior. Epstein and Knight found evidence that judges decide whether to 
grant certiorari on the basis of whether a case will be decided in accord with their policy 
preferences. Strategic judicial actions to ensure such accord can take the form of 
defensive denials – refusing to take a case the judge may wish to hear, out of an 
expectation of being unable to garner majority support – and aggressive grants – taking a 
case that may not warrant review because the judge calculates it may be good for 
developing a doctrine.49 
Judges have the benefit of conference discussion and less formal conversations, as 
well as a day-to-day interaction with their colleagues, to develop private knowledge of 
their colleagues’ proclivities. Although this evidence is necessarily indirect, a number of 
studies have provided evidence that judges have foreknowledge of their colleagues’ 
future outcomes.50 For instance, studies have found that judicial decisions depend on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
entire Court which, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reiterated again and again, have no precedential 
significance at all.” Singleton v. C.I.R., 99 S.Ct. 335, at 944-945 (1978). The lack of legal significance of 
the practice supports the argument of its informational effect. 
49 EPSTEIN AND KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 80. 
50 This is a fairly standard assumption in imperfect information models. See e.g., Michael Rothschild and 
Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: an Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 629, at 632 (1976).  It is also an assumption made by scholars 
studying the courts. See e.g., Epstein, Segal and Victor, supra note 26, at 420; however some assume the 
opposite, e.g. Baum, supra note 2, at 17. One of the few studies to challenge this notion is John F. Krol 
and Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 
43 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 335, at 338 (1990), but arguably their results actually support the 
hypothesis that judges consider their colleagues’ likely actions. Of the three hypotheses relating to this 
topic that they test, two are supported by the evidence, and the one which is not in fact relates to 
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level of support judges expect from other members of the court,51 implying some level of 
foreknowledge.52 These findings show both that judges can accurately anticipate their 
colleagues’ likely actions, and so their own chances of success, and that judges’ own 
actions vary with their likelihood of casting the pivotal vote. That is, these studies 
provide evidence to support each of the first three signaling assumptions. 
The final assumption is that litigants consider judicial signals when weighing the 
decision of whether to bring litigation. Even if judges did not know their colleagues’ 
pending positions, judges definitely possess some private information: their own vote. 
Pursuing litigation is a gamble, with high costs and uncertain payoffs. Any information a 
litigant receives from a judge as to his or her chances of success are factored into the 
litigant’s decision whether to litigate or not.53 To take an example, in death penalty cases, 
the litigant has little to lose in pursuing every right of appeal, and so judicial signals have 
minimal effect on a defendant’s decision to pursue litigation. But advocacy groups may 
need to be more discriminating. A signal that the Supreme Court is amenable to 
arguments that the death penalty should not apply to a particular class, such as juveniles 
or the mentally retarded, is likely to result in a number of such cases being presented by 
                                                                                                                                                 
predicting the behavior of uncertain judges only. 
51 See e.g., Boucher and Segal, supra note 27, at 832. 
52 Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. OF POLITICS 649, at 651 (1979).  
53 Justice Scalia noted the effect of the expectation that the Supreme Court was likely to rule in the Atkins 
case that the death penalty was cruel and unusual when applied to retarded defendants. He stated that 
“the mere pendency of the present cases has brought us petitions by death row inmates claiming for the 
first time, after multiple habeas petitions, that they are retarded.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, at 353-
354. 
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advocacy groups opposed to the death penalty. This conclusion has been supported by 
empirical studies.54  
Given this, in an era of litigant groups, such as the NAACP, who in aggregate are 
ready and willing to bring cases on almost any contentious view, judges can significantly 
influence their own agendas by sharing their private information. The following game 
examines whether a judge with a partial alignment of preferences with a potential litigant 
has an incentive to mislead the litigant, and how that incentive shapes the actions of 
judges in such a scenario.  
 
III. THE JUDICIAL SIGNALING GAME 
Players: This game models two interlinked actions: the decision of a Judge (J) on a 
multi-judge panel as to what sort of signal to send to potential litigants; and the choice of 
a potential Party (P) as to whether to pursue a legal action or not, given such signals. We 
are considering a Judge and a Party who each support the same position. 
A simplified representation of the game, with only one judge and one litigant, is 
represented in Figure 1, however the model accounts for multiple players. The trading of 
information is like a market: judges will reveal their private information when they can 
benefit from doing so and the costs of signaling that information are not overwhelming. 
                                                 
54 Kevin T. McGuire and Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: 
Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AMER. POLI. SCI. REV. 717, at 718 (1993). Vanessa Baird, The 
Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda, J. OF POLITICS (forthcoming). 
A counter-argument is that litigants may not be able to interpret such signals, however Nelson, supra 
note 36, at 751, showed that consumers of signaling information do not need to assess the information 
intelligently for signaling to be effective. Also, litigants usually have advocates, who are experts and so 
can be expected to interpret judicial signals on litigants’ behalves. 
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However, the benefits and costs that determine each judge’s utility from signaling will 
depend on what each other judge is signaling. Thus the signaling level will depend on the 
beliefs and actions of each judge and each party, in equilibrium. The results show when 
there is an incentive for judges to send accurate signals, to send misleading signals, and 
when it is possible to see contradictory signals from different judges. 
Play: The outcome of a given case can be represented as being determined by nature, 
reflecting the fact that litigants do not know the outcome of cases before they decide to 
pursue litigation. Even though the Judge votes on the outcome of the case, the draw by 
nature can be seen as occurring after the Judge has formed a definite opinion on the issue. 
Figure 1: The Judicial Signaling Game 
jW – C(S), 1 – CL 
Legend  
Players:  
N Nature 
P Party (a litigant) 
JW Judge, if facing a win 
JL Judge, if facing a loss 
Actions:  
Lit. Litigate (P) 
NLit. Not Litigate (P) 
Signal (S) Signal Continuum (J) 
Payoffs:  
jW Win litigated (J) 
jL Loss litigated (J) 
C(S) Cost of signaling (J) 
CL Cost of litigating (P) 
CNL Cost of not litigating (P) 
Probability:  
α Probability of a win 
JW P Lit. 
 
α 
 NLit.
Win 0 – C(S), 0 – CNLN Signal range  
1 – α 
jL – C(S), 0 – CL 
JL PLoss 
Lit. 
 
NLit. Signal range 0 – C(S), 0 – CNL
The game is modeled with the signaling Judge as one of two types: a winning type 
(JW), who faces a case in which the side they and the litigant support will win, or a losing 
type (JL), whose preferred side will lose. JW gains utility from the case being heard and 
won by the side he or she supports (jW); JL gains utility from the case being heard and 
lost (jL). The Judge faces a signaling choice on anticipation of how his or her colleagues 
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will vote, based on the private information each judge has by virtue of his or her 
position.55 
A potential litigating Party (P) does not know whether their case will win or lose, but 
has an ex ante belief of the underlying probability of the case succeeding: α = the 
independent probability of a Win; 1 – α = the independent probability of a Loss. The 
Party can update its expectation of success based on the signal it receives from the Judge. 
Thus the Party is a Bayesian updater.  
Although the Judge may know the distribution of all the potential parties’ ex ante 
probabilities of litigating, it is unrealistic to assume that the Judge knows every individual 
Party’s ex ante probability of litigating, i.e. each Party’s individual costs and benefits of 
litigating. The orthodox assumption in signaling games is that the more informed party, 
the Judge, has perfect knowledge of the Party’s ex ante probability of litigating, even 
when there are multiple potential parties. Consequently, the Judge can perfectly 
anticipate how the Party will act in each game. The perfect knowledge assumption 
drastically curtails the possible outcomes; unique equilibria result, but this outcome is 
                                                 
55 For courts with random distribution of judges, the models still applies but the signals will be discounted 
in proportion to the probability that the signaling judge will appear on the relevant bench. For inferior 
courts, a major issue regarding agendas is the potential for forum shopping. While this model may apply 
to forum shopping, particularly if courts are in competition with one another over certain issues, forum 
shopping is not the focus of this article. In the Federal courts, parties have an automatic right of appeal. 
This need not undermine the signaling process. A party may be uncertain whether to expend the 
resources in pursuing their appeal, and thus rely on signals from judges as to their amenability to the 
party’s case. Also, advocates may use judicial signals to determine whether they are best off expending 
their resources in judicial or other forms of issue development, to choose the best timing for a case, or to 
determine the best vehicle for advocating their chosen issue. 
 24
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art6
based on artificially restrictive parameters. To combat this limitation, this article’s model 
relaxes one assumption of common knowledge: while the judge is also a Bayesian 
updater, his or her information is updated probabilistically. This has the dual advantages 
of making the game more realistic and the assumptions less restrictive. 
An example illustrates the order of the play of the game: in the death penalty series of 
cases, while writing the majority opinion in the retarded defendant case,56 Justice Stevens 
sent a signal encouraging litigants to bring a juvenile defendant death penalty case. 
Subsequently, such litigation was brought57 but failed despite the encouraging signal 
from the majority. Only two years later did a majority form for Stevens’ position. 
  
Payoffs: 
Party: The last move is made by the Party. The Party has the choice of litigating (lit) or 
not litigating (NL). If the Party litigates, a win has positive utility, the value of which is 
normalized at utility = 1, a loss at utility = 0; either way, this is reduced by the cost of 
litigating (CL), which represents attorney charges, court fees etc. If the Party chooses not 
to litigate, there are no legal costs, but the Party bears the cost of not pursuing their legal 
case (CNL); for example this could be the Party’s cost of bearing its own damages.  
Thus the Party’s payoffs are: 
UP = {1 – CL  if litigate and win 
 {0 – CL  if litigate and lose 
 {0 – CNL if not litigate 
 (where 1 – CL > 0 > –CNL > –CL) 
  
                                                 
56 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304, at 309 n. 6 (2002). 
57 Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 24, at 24 (2002) and Hain v. Mullin, 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003). 
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Judge: After Nature moves, the Judge observes the inevitable outcome of the case if it is 
brought. The Judge gains positive utility from both a winning case being litigated (jW) 
and losing case being litigated (jL), although more from a winning case (jW > jL). The 
Judge gains nothing if the case is not litigated. The Judge incurs a cost of signaling (CS), 
the extent of which is determined by the level of directness of signal and whether the 
Judge sends an accurate or misleading signal (discussed below). 
Thus the Judge’s payoffs are: 
 
UJ = {jW – CS(.) if litigated and wins 
 {jL   – CS(.) if litigated and loses 
 {0  – CS(.) if not litigated 
 (where jW > jL > 0)58 
 
Signaling Costs: The Judge has a continuum of signaling options, including sending no 
signal. Knowing whether the case is a winner or a loser, the Judge makes two decisions 
within the one action: the judge decides whether to send an accurate or misleading signal; 
and the judge decides how direct to make the signal. Both choices affect cost as both are 
tied to judicial reputation.59 Firstly, the signaling Judge bears the cost of signaling, 
increasing with the level of directness of signaling activity: this cost encompasses such 
factors as the forum in which the signal is given, including the size and type of the 
audience; and how overt the signal is. This cost is due to judicial reputation resting on 
                                                 
58 Both jW and jL are positive, as we are looking at the cases where the judge wants to hear the case 
regardless of its outcome. As such, by the definition of the game, both values are exogenous and provide 
positive utility to the judge. 
59 Signaling costs can arise through other mechanisms, such as checking and fining by the uninformed party. 
See Austen-Smith and Wright, supra note 39, at 229-257. 
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lack of prejudgment: any signals of intent regarding future cases are costly to this aspect 
of reputation. Secondly, the Judge bears an additional cost for signaling falsely. In the 
judicial arena, even though signaling is costly for both types of judges, judges who 
repeatedly signal falsely will develop a reputation of unreliability, or worse, dishonesty; 
consequently, while a judge with a losing case can signal a winning case, the cost of 
doing so is higher than for a judge who actually has a winning case. Judges choose 
whether to send a misleading or accurate signal, and how direct to make the signal; 
consequently costs are endogenous.  
 
Choice of Actions: 
Party: given the signal observed, the expected utilities to the Party of litigating and not 
litigating are: 
EUP(Lit|SW)  = Pr(W|SW) – CL 
EUP(Lit|SL)  = Pr(W|SL) – CL 
EUP(NL)  = – CNL 
The Party weighs the costs and benefits of litigating and not litigating, given the signal 
the Party has seen. The Party’s utility of litigating is and product of its updated 
expectation of whether it has a winning case, based on any signal it has seen, discounted 
by the cost of litigating, and this is weighed against its costs of not litigating. 
 
Judge: given the Judge’s Bayesian expectations of whether the Party will litigate, the 
expected utilities of the Judge of signaling at some level S=S* in each state of nature are: 
EUJ(S*, JW) = jW.Pr(Lit.|S*) – C(S*) 
EUJ(S*, JL) = jL.Pr(Lit.|S*) – C(S*) 
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That is, each type of judge’s expected utility is the sum of the expected utility from the 
case being litigated and the expected utility when the case is not litigated. The former 
component equates to the utility of hearing the case minus the cost of the signal, 
multiplied by the Party’s probability of litigating, which is contingent on the signal. For 
the latter component, there is no positive utility gained, only the cost of the signal 
multiplied by the Party’s probability of not litigating, contingent on the signal. Thus the 
cost is fixed, and the benefit is contingent on the Party litigating. 
 
Equilibrium Concept: As this is a signaling game, the equilibrium concept used is 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). This requires that players’ actions are best 
responses, beliefs are consistent with actions and vice versa, and that players Bayesian 
update where possible. 
Figure 2:  Probability of Litigation, Judicial Preferences and Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria as a Product of Signaling Cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SW0
Probability of 
Litigation 
Pr(lit) 
1 
Pr(lit)1 
JL JW
0 Smax 
Pr(lit)2 
JW`
PrW0 
Signal (s) 
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The relationship between expected judicial utility and a continuum of signaling 
options in the information market is represented in Figure 2. The proofs stand 
independent of this figure, but it is illustrative of the relevant signaling and probability 
levels that determine the equilibria. 
Figure 2 represents the Party’s probability of litigation (Pr(lit)) as a product of the 
Judge’s signaling level (S) for each type of judge. Thus the x-axis represents the Judge’s 
strategic choice and the y-axis represents the Judge’s expectation of the Party’s strategic 
choice. This enables the possible equilibria to be graphed; the separating equilibrium is 
represented by two single dots; the pooling equilibria are represented by the solid black 
line bounded by two dots (discussed in detail below). 
Figure 2 also represents the preferences of each type of judge. These preferences are 
represented by indifference curves, in which points above and to the left are favored to 
points below and to the right. Each judge is indifferent to all points along each of their 
own indifference curves, labeled JW, JW` and JL. JW` is concentric to JW, representing 
higher utility. JL is JL’s indifference curve that runs through the origin; it reaches Pr(lit) = 
1 at signaling level Smax. This point Smax is significant, as it will be shown that this is the 
maximum level of signaling that will be seen. 
Both types of judges’ indifference curves are monotonic: the expected probability of 
litigation is always increasing with greater signaling. Thus the Judge’s indifference 
curves are probably convex: more explicit signaling is less likely to be cheap talk.60 JW 
has a less steep indifference curve than JL, which captures the difference in their 
                                                 
60 In Figure 2, the relationship is graphed as convex, but it could be any monotonic shape, and could even 
be rescaled as linear; the important element is monotonicity.  
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marginal benefits (jL < jW): for the same increase in the probability of litigation, JW can 
afford more costly signals than JL can. The single crossing property holds.  
Judicial utility is a product of the probability of litigation and the benefits to the 
Judge, conditional on the outcome of the case, minus the cost of signaling. With no 
signaling, each type of Judge’s utility is the respective utility each would receive if the 
case is litigated, multiplied by Pr(lit)*, the ex ante probability of litigation.  
Pr(lit)* is the ex ante probability that the Party will litigate with no meaningful 
information as to the type of the Judge. This is exogenous and so can be any level, but the 
level determines which equilibria exist. Consequently, Figure 2 graphs two possible 
Pr(lit)*s, Pr(lit)1 and Pr(lit)2. Pr(lit)1 lies below the point PrW0, Pr(lit)2 lies above. PrW0 is 
the requisite ex ante probability of litigation the Party must possess for the winning type 
of judge to be indifferent between signaling at level Smax and not signaling. It is proved 
below that the relationship between Pr(lit)* and PrW0 determines whether some of the 
equilibria exists.  
Below, four hypotheses are made and proved, which together fully describe all of the 
possible Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). Hypothesis 1 is that a separating equilibrium 
exists with the losing type signaling at (0,0) and the winning type signaling at (Smax,1); 
this is not contingent on the position of Pr(lit)*. This result means that there is always an 
equilibrium outcome where litigants can differentiate between judges with the winning 
cases and judges facing losing cases. Hypothesis 2 is that a pooling chattering 
equilibrium exists, with neither party signaling. Hypothesis 3 is that the position of 
Pr(lit)* relative to PrW0 determines whether pooling equilibria exists: if Pr(lit)* < PrW0, no 
pooling equilibria exist. Practically, this means that the prior probability that the Party 
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will litigate in the absence of any signal determines whether signals reveal whether the 
case is a winner or a loser. Hypothesis 4 is that if Pr(lit)* ≥ PrW0, a range of pooling 
equilibria exist between (0, Pr(lit)2) and (SW0, Pr(lit)2), where SW0 is the maximum level 
of signaling the winning type of judge will tolerate if the probability of litigating remains 
at Pr(lit)2. That is, if the ex ante probability of litigating is adequately high, a range of 
equilibria exist in which it is impossible to tell honest judges from dishonest judges. 
Together, these four hypotheses describe all the possible equilibria. In summary, there 
can exist both pooling and separating equilibria. With pooling levels of signaling, as 
signaling increases the probability of litigation stays constant at Pr(lit)*, but the expected 
judicial utility decreases because of the increasing cost of the signal. The highest level of 
signaling that will be seen is Smax. This is because even when Pr(lit) = 1, if S=Smax, 
EU(JL) =JL – C(Smax) = 0; i.e. the costs of signaling equals the benefits JL gains from the 
litigation being heard. At Smax, JW’s utility jumps to jW – C(Smax), because Pr(lit) = 1; the 
Party litigates because it knows that only the winning judge can afford to signal, and so 
the signal proves the case will win. Since EUJ(S=0, L) = EUJ(S=Smax, L) = 0, by standard 
assumption, JL will choose S=0 over S=Smax.61 As Figure 2 shows, EU(Smax, W ) > 0; it is 
still worthwhile for the winning judge to signal at this level. 
The litigant is unwilling to litigate at all if he or she believes the judge is a losing type. 
As such, if a separating equilibrium exists, the requisite signaling level at which the party 
can be certain of distinguishing between the types must be Smax, because this is the point 
                                                 
61 This is standard practice, because JW can tolerate Smax +ε (where ε = the smallest possible increment 
increase), whereas JL cannot, so the equilibrium concept dictates that JL will choose S=0 when 
indifferent. 
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at which it is no longer profitable for the losing type of judge to signal so as to be 
inseparable from the winning type. This leads to the first hypotheses: a separating 
equilibrium exists with the losing type of judge (JL) signaling at point (0, 0) and the 
winning type of judge (JW) signaling at (Smax, 1). 
 
Hypothesis 1: A unique separating PBE exists with JL signaling at (0,0) and JW 
signaling at (Smax, 1), for any Pr(lit)*. 
The proof of Hypothesis 1 has two parts which are in Appendix 1. In words, the first 
part of this proof shows that if the Party believes that any signal below Smax indicates a 
losing case, then JL’s utility is maximized by not signaling, and JW’s utility is 
maximized by signaling at Smax. This confirms the Party’s beliefs, and so JL not signaling 
and JW signaling at Smax is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The second part of the proof 
shows that no other separating equilibrium exists: if any signal less than Smax would 
convince the Party that the signal emanated from a Judge with majority support, both 
type of judges would signal at that level, as both could afford to do so. In that case, the 
Party’s initial beliefs are unsustainable and so any other separating equilibrium fails. 
The effect of establishing hypothesis 1 is that one equilibrium outcome that always 
exists is for the two types of judges to be differentiable by the Party. Consequently, in 
this equilibrium, judges facing a winning case will signal, but judges facing a losing case 
will not signal and mislead litigants regarding their chances of success. Additionally, 
contradictory signals will not be observed, because only JW can afford to signal at a level 
that will be credible enough to convince a Party to litigate. Signaling will be observed at 
level Smax and parties will recognize that signal as being sent by JW and know they can 
rely on it. 
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 Hypothesis 2: A pooling PBE exists with both JW and JL signaling at (0,0), for any 
Pr(lit)*. 
The proof for Hypothesis 2 is in Appendix 2. It shows that if the Party believes that 
signaling any signal could emanate from either type of judge, then both JL and JW 
maximize their utility by not signaling, because the Party will litigate with the ex ante 
probability Pr(lit)*, regardless of what signal is sent. This is because signaling is costly, 
and in this case it has no effect, so judicial utility is maximized by not signaling. This 
reinforces the Party’s ex ante beliefs when zero signaling is observed. The observance of 
any other level of signaling is of the equilibrium path, and as such not defined by the 
equilibrium.   
So signaling (0,0) is a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium, however it is a 
“chattering equilibrium,” and has minimal significance. It shows that signaling can have 
no effect, but only when the Party has pre-existing beliefs that signaling is meaningless. It 
tells us nothing of how the Party will react to signaling, as the observance of any 
signaling is off the equilibrium path. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If Pr(lit)* ≤ PrW0, no other PBE exists. 
The proof of Hypothesis 3 has two parts and appears in Appendix 3. The first part of 
this proof shows that if the Party believes that not signaling reveals the judge as having a 
losing case, JL will signal at some level S* greater than zero but less than Smax. But in 
this case JW can maximize his or her utility by signaling at Smax. Then the party will not 
believe any signal less than Smax comes from a judge with a winning case, and so will not 
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litigate unless it sees a signal of at least this level. Since JL cannot afford to signal at this 
level, no Perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium exists in this range when Pr(lit)1 ≤ PrW0. 
The second part of the proof establishes that if the Party has alternative beliefs to 
those above, believing instead that any signal equal to or greater than S* guarantees a 
winning case, then the losing judge has the incentive and capacity to deviate from the 
equilibrium and signal at level S*. This undermines the Party’s beliefs and so no 
separating PBE exists between the range (0, Pr(lit)*) to (Smax, Pr(lit)*).  
Combining Hypothesis 1 and the two parts of Hypothesis 2, when Pr(lit)* ≤ PrW0, the 
only PBEs that exist are a separating equilibrium with JL signaling at (0,0) and JW 
signaling at (Smax, 1) and a chattering equilibria with both types of judge signaling at 
(0,0). 
What these results show is that as long as the Party’s initial probability of litigating, 
prior to potential signaling, is adequately low, no misleading signals will be observed and 
no contradictory signals will be sent. This is because with a low ex ante probability of 
litigation occurring, expending resources on costly signaling is not worthwhile for judges 
with lower returns on cases – i.e. judges facing losing cases – as the expected judicial 
utility of the case is discounted by the Party’s low likelihood of litigating. 
 
Hypothesis 4: If Pr(lit)* > PrW0, pooling PBE exist between (0,0):(SW0), Pr(lit)*) only. 
Note: SW0 is the maximum level of signaling at which JW is willing to pool with JL, such 
that the Party litigates with probability Pr(lit)2. At SW0+ε, JW prefers to signal at Smax and 
be differentiated from the losing type. SW0 is the point which the JW` indifference curve 
running through Smax insects with the Pr(lit)2 line. 
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It has already been shown in the proof of Hypothesis 1 that no separating equilibria 
exist in the range SW0 to Smax. Additionally, it has been shown in the proof of Hypothesis 
2 that (0,0) is a pooling equilibria; this proof shows that similar analysis holds for 
anything in the range (0,0) to (SW0, Pr(lit)*). It has two parts and appears in Appendix 4. 
The first part of the proof shows that if the Party believes that signaling less than 
some level S* reveals a judge as a losing type, but that signaling above this level does not 
guarantee the judge is a winning type, then both JW and JL will maximize their utility by 
signaling at exactly level S*. This is consistent with the Party’s initial beliefs, so 
signaling in the range (0,0) to (SW0,  Pr(lit)*) is a range of Perfect Bayesian Pooling 
Equilibria. This means that, subject to their ex ante beliefs, litigants are unable to 
differentiate between judges signaling in this range. 
It remains to be proved that signaling in the range (SW0,  Pr(lit)*) to (Smax,1) does not 
support any PBE. The second part of the proof shows that if the Party believes any signal 
above Smax guarantees a winner and any signal below SW0 is non-determinative, JW’s 
maximum utility is achieved by signaling at Smax. This is inconsistent with the Party’s 
beliefs and so the equilibrium fails.  
The proof of Hypothesis 4 established that pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibria exist 
between 0 and SW0, but not between (SW0) and (Smax). This means that signals less than 
SW0 could be misleading signals sent by judges facing losing cases who nevertheless wish 
to see the issue litigated. It also shows that multiple and contradictory signals could be 
sent by judges, with one judge suggesting one side has majority support and another 
judge showing the opposite. 
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The result is that the Party will not know who to believe, and signals will not 
motivate the Party to litigate at a higher likelihood than they would have otherwise. Why 
then will judges signal, given that signaling is costly? Because if the judge does not 
signal, another judge could send a signal contrary to the silent judge’s preferences, and 
that signal would be credible in the absence of any other information, and the Party will 
act accordingly. Misleading signaling can become credible in this equilibrium range if 
not countered by an opposing signal, because it will appear to the Party that the Judge 
that signals is the only one who can afford to do so, and so will be presumed to be JW. So 
both types of judge will signal, so as to not appear to be JL by default, even though 
signaling will not show the Party which type of judge is JW. 
 
Implications: 
The first result of note is that the model indicates what the upper bound on the level 
of signaling is. Signaling will not occur beyond Smax. Smax is the threshold beyond which 
it is not worthwhile for the losing type to signal; consequently, litigants’ beliefs do not 
rest on an expectation of signaling beyond this point, and so winning types also have no 
incentive to signal beyond Smax.  
The position of Smax is determined by the losing type’s indifference curve: Smax is the 
point at which the JL indifference curve running through the origin intersects with the 
Pr(lit) = 1 line. This yields the first comparative static: the steeper the JL slope, the lower 
Smax is. This result is intuitive: the more costly it is to send misleading signals, the easier 
it is to differentiate between winning and losing judges. 
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The second result is that when PrW0 > Pr(lit)*, no pooling equilibria exist in which 
signaling occurs. This has considerable normative implications: if the ex ante probability 
of litigation is adequately low, losing judges do not have the ability to mislead potential 
litigants as to their chances of success.  
The third result, however, is that when PrW0 ≤ Pr(lit)*, a range of pooling equilibria 
exist, and so the problem of losing judges being able to mislead litigants reappears, with 
multiple equilibria supported by a range of signaling options. 
The relationship that determines whether pooling equilibria other than the chattering 
equilibria exist depends firstly on the ex ante probability of litigation. This factor is 
entirely exogenous, and depends on such factors as the resources the potential litigant 
possesses, and their perceived chances of winning, prior to any signaling. Ironically, high 
litigation costs, which will lower the ex ante probability of litigation, will therefore 
protect the litigant from misleading signals. The second factor is the point PrW0, which is 
determined by the combination of the position of Smax and JW`, the winning type’s 
indifference curve that runs through Smax. The conclusion that the existence of pooling 
equilibria that involve signaling depend on the ex ante probability of litigation and the 
point of indifference for the winning type of judge yields two more comparative statics: 
firstly, the lower Smax is, the higher PrW0 is. This in turn makes it less likely that pooling 
equilibria exist. Combining the first two comparative statics, the more costly misleading 
signaling is, the less likely any pooling equilibria involving signaling can exist at all.  
The third comparative static is that the steeper the winning type’s indifference curve 
is, the lower PrW0 is, and so the more likely pooling equilibria exist. Thus the greater the 
difference between the winning and losing types’ indifference curves, the less able losing 
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types are to pool with winning types. The difference between the two curves is dependent 
on the costs and benefits of hearing a winning and losing case, which is exogenous.  
The fourth result is that the range of pooling equilibria is bounded by the point SW0, 
which is determined by the intersection between Pr(lit)* and JW` (assuming Pr(lit)* ≥ 
PrW0). This yields the final two comparative statics: the lower the ex ante probability of 
litigation, the narrower the range of pooling equilibria; and the steeper the winning type’s 
indifference curve, the broader the range of possible pooling equilibria. These two results 
are variations on the previous results. 
The combination of all of the above results has broader implications for recent cases 
regarding penalties imposed for judicial communications, such as extensive judicial 
campaigns.62 This case struck down ethical restrictions on judicial campaigning conduct 
as contrary to the First Amendment. The game’s results show that, by making sincere 
signaling more easily achievable without fear of sanction, this ruling could enable sincere 
judges to more easily differentiate themselves and create separating equilibria. However 
by lowering the costs of potentially misleading signals, such a ruling could instead make 
pooling more achievable. Which equilibria will occur will depend on how much the costs 
of signaling are lowered, but by enabling greater judicial signaling, this game shows that 
decisions such as White also promote the cheap talk of misleading signals. 
In response to the White case, the ABA is re-examining its regulation of judicial 
speech.63 However, unless the new regulations factor in the interplay this game has 
revealed to exist between the cost of signaling and the capacity of judges with majority 
                                                 
62 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct 2528 (2002). 
63 See American Bar Association, ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,  
http://www.abanet.org/yld/elibrary/memphis04pdf/ethicscanon.pdf. 
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support to differentiate themselves from judges without such support, the new regulations 
could have unintended consequences. 
 
III.A Proof that Judges Have an Incentive to Mislead Litigants 
A final implication of the game warrants further scrutiny. The existence of pooling 
equilibria indicates that, in some circumstances, litigants are unable to differentiate 
between judges who face a winning and a losing case. This means that judges can 
misrepresent the cases before them; of particular importance is the possibility that judges 
can signal that cases will win when in fact they will lose. The game so far has proved that 
judges could misrepresent losing cases as winners; if the Judge’s strategic choice is 
simplified to choosing between sincere and misleading signaling, it is possible to prove 
that judges do have the incentive to misrepresent cases. 
If the costs to the Judge are simply the cost of signaling truthfully, CT, and the cost of 
signaling falsely, CF, and CT < CF, then the following hypothesis follows. 
 
Hypothesis 5: JL has an incentive to send misleading signals if jL > CF  – CT 
 
The proof of Hypothesis 5 is in Appendix 5. If P believes J always tells the truth, then 
a winning signal implies a winning case with probability = 1, and a losing signal 
guarantees a losing case. As such, the Party’s expected utility from litigating when 
observing a signal of a winner and a signal of a loser is 1 and 0 respectively. The Party 
will litigate if and only if it sees a winning signal. As such, when the Judge observes a 
winning case, he or she will always signal a winner. But as long as jL > CF  – CT, that is, 
as long as the benefits to JL of sending misleading signals outweigh the difference in 
costs between signaling accurately his or her lack of majority support and sending 
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misleading signals, JL has an incentive to send misleading signals, suggesting a winner. 
The Party’s initial beliefs are unsustainable, and so when jL > CF  – CT, no PBE can exist 
where judges always truthfully signal. 
A table of results of the comprehensive model of the game in which the Judge only 
chooses between signaling honestly and signaling falsely can be found in Appendix 6. 
Separating, semi-separating and mixing pooling equilibria exist. A similar model with 
three strategy choices by the Judge – signaling truthfully, signaling falsely and not 
signaling – yields similar results.64 Hypothesis 5, however, contains the most important 
result, which is that judges have an incentive to misrepresent a losing case as a winning 
case as long as the benefits of hearing the case cover the reputational costs of issuing 
such misleading signals. 
 
Implications:  
When judges face cases in which their favored side will lose, they can only be relied 
upon to consistently signal the truth when the payoffs from hearing the case are 
sufficiently low. For litigants, this means that foreknowledge that a judge cares strongly 
about an issue, and not just an outcome, should lead to skepticism of any judicial signal. 
Litigants can look to cues such as the importance of the doctrine in the area and prior 
indications of strong feelings of judges on like matters to determine the likelihood of 
misrepresentation-inducing strength of judicial feeling. This is unfortunate for any judge 
wishing to shape the court’s agenda, as the issues judges consider to be most important 
will, due to Bayesian updating, also be those which they have least influence over. 
 
                                                 
64 Proofs for either of these games can be obtained from the author. 
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CONCLUSION 
This game explains seemingly incongruous results, such as the 2003 series of death 
penalty cases: judges signal the future outcome of cases, but sometimes those judges have 
incentives to exaggerate the chances of success of the position they support. This 
conceptual explanation is supported by a rigorous model of judicial signaling behavior 
and the effect it has on litigants’ responses. The results of the game provide a framework 
for understanding and predicting how signaling of judges’ private information to 
potential litigants takes place, and what its effects are.  
This behavior has been shown to be systematically explicable, as a number of 
equilibria have been proved to exist. The comparative statics outlined above explained 
how and when different signaling behavior manifests itself, in accordance with the beliefs 
and actions of each player. The existence of a separating equilibrium is a positive 
normative result, as it suggests that in some circumstances litigants are able to 
differentiate between cases that will and will not succeed. However the equilibrium only 
occurs if judges facing winning cases can afford to signal at the level Smax. This condition 
is by no means guaranteed: institutional limits, be they legal restraints, such as 
impeachment, or conventional constraints, such as an expectation of judicial 
circumspection, may render judges unable to signal as overtly as the separating 
equilibrium condition requires. Consequently, the pooling equilibria may be the only 
achievable equilibria. 
 The existence of pooling equilibria indicates that, in some circumstances, litigants 
are unable to differentiate between judges who face a winning and a losing case. This 
means that judges can misrepresent the cases before them; in particular, judges signal that 
 41
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
a case will succeed when in fact it will fail. The final hypothesis showed that when 
judges gain a benefit from a case even when it loses, they have an incentive to 
misrepresent the prospects of those cases. 
This does not necessarily mean that signaling harms the litigant. Signaling literature 
suggests that even if more informed players have an incentive to misrepresent, as long as 
the uninformed party is a Bayesian updater, even misleading signals can still convey 
some information.65 Nevertheless, the result that judges send misleading signals to 
potential litigants fundamentally challenges accepted notions of how judges do and 
should behave. 
The conclusion that cases of particular salience to a judge provide less opportunity for 
credible signaling returns us to the mystery of Justice Scalia’s motivation for his 
comments in response to the Newdow case. If Justice Scalia’s position and strength of 
feeling on the issue were easily anticipated, then he would need to use particularly strong 
and costly signals to be believed. But Smax may have been more than he could ultimately 
afford, in terms of conventional restraints on judicial conduct. Justice Scalia’s actions 
illustrate the relationship between the cost of signaling and the effect on credibility of the 
signal.  
But one question remains: if the case was almost certainly going to the Supreme 
Court, with or without encouragement from Justice Scalia, why did he engage in such 
costly signaling behavior? Although Justice Scalia’s behavior is unambiguously signaling 
                                                 
65 Austen-Smith and Wright, supra note 39, and Potters and Van Winden, supra note 35. Gilligan and 
Krehbiel, supra note 35,  even show the information receiver may grant the signaler power to encourage 
such signaling, even with an incentive to misrepresent, such as restrictive rules on committees.  
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behavior, it may be a different type of signaling than analyzed herein, that is, signaling by 
judges to potential litigants. Judges may wish to signal to other audiences, for different 
reasons. In particular, Justice Scalia in this case, and judges more generally, may wish to 
signal the future direction of a court to legislative or executive officials, in the hope of 
influencing their responses to judicial action;66 judges may wish to pressure their 
colleagues to stay with a prior commitment in support of the signaling judge’s position; 
or judges may wish to signal their attitudes on a particular issue to lower courts, beyond 
or before the bounds of precedent. Analysis of these other forms of signaling is beyond 
the realm of this article. However, this article has provided a framework for 
understanding judicial signaling behavior, and its model of judicial signaling can be 
adapted in future work to account for the subtleties of these different types of signaling. 
                                                 
66 See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Deny Inmate Appeal in Execution of Juveniles, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Jan 28, 2003, who suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision to accept appeals from Guantanamo Bay 
prisoners is sending a signal to the Bush administration that it is “intent on exercising its power to the 
maximum extent possible” and will not yield to the “imperial presidency.” 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Hypothesis 1: A unique separating PBE exists with JL signaling at (0,0) and JW 
signaling at (Smax, 1), for any Pr(lit)*. 
Lemma 1: A separating PBE exists with JL signaling at (0,0) and JW signaling at (Smax, 
1), for any Pr(lit)*. 
Proof: 
Let S* be some S: 0 < S* < Smax 
If P believes  Pr(L| S<Smax) = 1 
and        Pr(W| S≥Smax) = 1 
Then: 
EUJ(S=0, L) = 0 
EUJ(S=S*, L) = 0.JL – C(S*)   < 0  
EUJ(S=Smax, L) = 1.JL  – C(Smax)   < 0  
then pr(S=0, L) = 1 
And: 
EUJ(S=0, W) = 0 
EUJ(S=S*, W) = 0.JW  – C(S*)   < 0  
EUJ(S=Smax, W) = 1.JW  – C(Smax) > 0.  
then Pr(S= Smax, W) = 1 
Then: 
Pr(S=Smax, W) = 1 
So Pr(W|Smax) = 1 
and Pr(lit|Smax) = 1 
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Lemma 2: No other separating PBE exists. 
Proof by Contradiction: 
Let S` be some S: 0 < S` < Smax – ε 
If P believes  Pr(L| S<Smax – ε) = 1 
and        Pr(W| S≥Smax – ε) = 1 
Then: 
EUJ(S=0, L) = 0 
EUJ(S=S*, L) = 0.JL – C(S` – ε)   < 0  
EUJ(S=Smax–ε, L) = 1.JL  – C(Smax – ε) > 0  
then Pr(S=Smax – ε, L) = 1 
and P will not believe Pr(W| S≥Smax – ε) = 1 
 
APPENDIX 2 
Hypothesis 2: A pooling PBE exists with both JW and JL signaling at (0,0), for any 
Pr(lit)*. 
Proof: 
Let S* be some S: 0 < S* 
If P believes  Pr(W|S=0) = α 
   Pr(W| S>0) = α 
Then: 
EUJ(S=0, L) = JL.Pr(lit)* 
EUJ(S=S*, L) = JL.Pr(lit)* – C(S*) 
So pr(S=0, L) = 1 
And:   
EUJ(S=0, W) = JW.Pr(lit)* 
EUJ(S=S*, W) = JW.Pr(lit)* – C(S*) 
So Pr(S=0, W) = 1 
Then pr(lit|S=0) = Pr(lit)*  
And pr(lit|S>0) is off the equilibrium path. 
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 APPENDIX 3 
Hypothesis 3: If Pr(lit)* ≤ PrW0, no other PBE exists. 
Lemma 3: If Pr(lit)* ≤ PrW0, no Pooling PBE exist between the range (0, Pr(lit)*) to (Smax, 
Pr(lit)*). 
Proof: 
Let S* be some S: 0 < S* < Smax 
If P believes Pr(W|S>0) = α  
And  Pr(W|S=0) = 0      
Then: 
EUJ(S=0, L) = 0 
EUJ(S*>0, L) = JL.Pr(lit)* – C(S*) > 0    
Then pr(S=0, L) = 0 
And: 
EUJ(S*>0, W) = JW.Pr(lit)* – C(S*)  
whereas EUJ(Smax, W) = 1.JW  – C(Smax). 
Since Pr(lit)* < 1 and C(S*) < C(Smax), 
Then EUJ(S=S*,W) < EUJ(S=Smax,W)  
So pr(S=Smax, W) = 1 
And pr(Lit.|S<Smax) = 0 
 
Lemma 4: If Pr(lit)* ≤ PrW0, no separating PBE exist between the range(0, Pr(lit)*) to 
(Smax, Pr(lit)*). 
Proof: 
Let S* be some S: 0 < S* < Smax 
If P believes Pr(W|S≥S*) = 1 
 and Pr(W|S<S*) = 0 
Then EUJ(S*, L) = JL.1 – C(S*) > 0 
Then Pr(S=S*, L) = 1 
And so Pr(W|S≥S*) ≠ 1 
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 APPENDIX 4 
Hypothesis 4: If Pr(lit)* > PrW0, pooling PBE exist between (0,0):(SW0), Pr(lit)*) only. 
Lemma 5: (S*, Pr(lit)*) is a pooling PBE. 
Proof: 
Let S` and S~ be some S’s: 0 < S~ < S* < S` < Smax  
If P believes Pr(L|S<S*) = 1 
  Pr(W|S≥S*) = α 
Then: 
EUJ(S=S~) = 0.JL – C(S~) 
EUJ(S=S*) = Pr(lit)*.JL – C(S*) 
EUJ (S=S`) = Pr(lit)*.JL – C(S`) < Pr(lit).JL – C(S*) 
So pr(S=S*, L) = 1  
The same analysis holds true for a Judge facing a winning case, once again because 
Pr(lit)* > PrW0, from which it follows that: 
EUJ(Smax, W) = JW.1 – C(Smax) < JW.Pr(lit)* – C(S*) = EUJ(S*, W) 
Then for P: 
Pr(W|S*) = α 
And  Pr(Lit.|S*) = Pr(lit)* 
 
Lemma 6: (SW0,  Pr(lit)*) to (Smax,1) is not a pooling PBE: 
Proof by Contradiction: 
Let S` be some S: SW0 < S` < Smax 
If P believes Pr(W|S`) = α 
and Pr(W|Smax) = 1 
Then: 
EUJ(S=S`, W) = Pr(lit)*.JW – C(S`) 
EUJ(S=Smax, W) = 1.JW – C(Smax) 
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Since EUJ[(S=SW0, W)|Pr(Lit.)=Pr(Lit.)*] = EUJ[(S=Smax, W)|Pr(Lit.)=1], by definition of 
SW0 
And EUJ[(S= SW0, W)|Pr(Lit.)= Pr(lit)*] > EUJ[(S=S`, W)|Pr(Lit.) =Pr(lit)*], by proof of 
Hypothesis 1, 
Then EUJ(S=Smax, W) > EUJ(S=S`, W) 
So Pr(S=Smax) = 1 
So Pr(W| S=S`) = 0 
And the Party’s beliefs are unsustainable. 
 
APPENDIX 5 
Hypothesis 5: JL have an incentive to send misleading signals if jL > CF  – CT 
Proof by Contradiction: 
If P believes Pr(W|SW) = 1 
And  Pr(W|SL) = 0 
Then by Bayes’ Rule: EUP(Lit.|SW) = [Pr(SW|W). Pr(W)]/Pr(SW) = (1.α)/α = 1 
And EUP(Lit.|SL) = 0 
Then: 
EUJ(SW, W) = jW – CT 
EUJ(SL, W) = – CT 
And: 
EUJ(SW, L) = jL – CF 
EUJ(SL, L) = – CT 
So if jL > CT – CF,  
then Pr(SW|L) = 1 
And Pr(W|SW) ≠ 1 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Table 1:  Summary of Equilibrium Conditions with Discrete Judicial Choices 
 
 
Equilibrium J Action Equilibrium Type Equilibrium P Response Conditions 
1.a  always signal 
honestly 
 
 
1.b  always signal falsely 
Separating 
 
 
 
Separating 
pr(Lit|W) = 1 
pr(Lit|L)  = 0 
 
 
No Equilibrium  
 
jL ≤ CF – CT 
 
 
 
 
2.a  always signal a 
winner 
 
2.b  always signal a loser 
Pooling 
 
 
Pooling 
Pr(lit) = 0 
 
 
Pr(lit) = 0 
 
α < CL  – CNL 
 
 
α < CL  – CNL 
 
3.a  always signal a 
winner if observe a 
winner; mix if 
observe a loser 
 
3.b  always signal a loser 
if observe a loser; 
mix if observe a 
winner 
 
Semi-Separating where 
SL is fully revealing 
 
 
 
Semi-Separating where 
SW is fully revealing 
 
pr(Lit.|SW) = 1  
pr(Lit. .|SL)  = 0 
 
 
 
No Equilibrium 
jL = CF – CN 
 
 
4.    mix if observe a 
winner and mix if 
observe a loser 
 
Pooling pr(Lit. .|SW) = 1 if 
pr(SW|L)/ pr(SW|W) ≤ 
[α/(1-α)].(1/(CL – CNL) – 
1); 0 otherwise 
 
jW + jL = CT + CF – 
2CN 
 
pr(SW|L)/ pr(SW|W) = 
[α/(1-α)](1/(CL – 
CNL) – 1) 
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